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## THE DEMAND OF THE INDUSTRIAL SPIRIT.

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THE city of Boston is at this moment the theater of experiments in the healing art that are attracting considerable attention. These experiments differ from those of the prayer-cure, the faith-cure, the cure by imposition of hands, by manipulation, by touch — the method by which the good King George III. expelled the king's-evil from so many hundreds of believing subjects in the last century. In these experiments no prayer is used, no faith is required, no physical contact is needed. Nay, more, on the part of the operator no knowledge of the human system is required, nor of the science of medicine. Cures are effected without faith on the part of the patient, or knowledge on the part of the physician. It is a wonderful step in advance in the science of life, and quite worthy of this sharp and self-sufficient age. Every element seems to be eliminated from the old-fashioned practice of the healing art — except the fee. That is the only thing that is not left to the imagination. I am sorry to say that this remains, for otherwise the ideal state would be reached, in which the physician would say to the patient, Imagine you are healed, and he would be healed, and the patient would say to the physician, Imagine you are paid, and he would be paid — *ex nihilo nihil*.

This remarkable process is dignified with the name of the "Mind-cure." Its grand merit is its simplicity. The patient resorts to the room of the physician. Few or no questions are asked, nothing like an examination is made, nor any apparent diagnosis. There is no question of tongue, pulse, or temperature. I believe the patient is even denied the luxury of rehearsing his complaints. The physician is above all such knowledge. The two, alone in the room, sit down, some distance apart. Nothing is done, nothing is said. The patient is not required to fix his mind upon anything. What the doctor is thinking about, heaven only knows, unless he is pondering the problem

of human credulity. A half-hour passes in silence. That is desirable. A half-hour given up to reflection is seldom lost. The patient then retires, without observations, without directions. This healing process is repeated the next day and the next, and every day for a half-hour for two or three weeks; and the patient is greatly relieved or cured entirely of whatever disease he had or imagined he had. The testimony on this point is abundant, and from good sources. Women walk the streets who have been bedridden for twenty years; men hear who have heard nothing since the war; and eyes that have been painfully askew for years get a rectified focus. The lame leap; the dyspeptic enjoy mincepie; the "issues," that have been worse than any in the court of chancery, cease.

There are thousands and thousands of people who believe this. They not only believe that actual cures are wrought, which may be matter of observation, but they believe they are wrought by some occult influence in these queer sittings with the mind-cure man. And a theory is provided by the operators of these wonders. As I understand it, it is something more than the effect of the mind of the mind-cure man upon the mind of the patient. The nerves report all sensations to the brain. But for this nervous communication, the sensations would not exist. Pain, therefore, or disease that causes pain, is not real except in the mind. There is no pain in the body after the mind has left it, as in the case of death, and there is no pain when that which communicates sensation to the mind is paralyzed by means of an anæsthetic. The logic of this explanation is that if you cure the mind, to all practical purposes, you rout the disease that has been dominating the mind. It is well known that in moments of intense mental excitement bodily pain and even grievous wounds are not recognized or felt. From such facts as these is educed the hypothesis of the possible supremacy of the mind in all cases of pain and disease. And in the case of an unreasoning child or insane person there must be established over the disease the supremacy of some other mind! In this unknown region of the relation of mind and body is room for the evolution of any sort of theory that assurance can possibly impose upon credulity. And to minds not trained in the detection of fallacies, or disciplined in logical processes, or taught to distinguish between cause and effect and events in juxtaposition of time and order, it seems conclusive that the

ability of a bedridden person to walk after sitting in a room with a mind-cure man is due to that visible process and not to some other cause.

As I am not attempting a sketch of human delusions, it is not necessary to follow out this case further. I only call attention to the fact that multitudes of people, and many of them of more than ordinary intelligence, believe that diseases are permanently removed by what is called the mind-cure. It is simply because this is believed by intelligent persons that I refer to it. It is worthy of note that Boston, which is reputed to furnish the brains for the continent, and is in fact superior, I suppose, to any other American city in general cultivation, is preëminently the hot-bed and home of delusions of this sort. Nowhere else does the mind-reader, the phrenologist, the spiritualistic medium, the clairvoyant, the magnetic medium, the natural bone-setter, the prayer-cure, faith-cure, touch-cure man or woman so thrive. In no other place that I know of is spiritualism more widely accepted, or are various tramps and scamps and impostors of our queer social state more run after. And this is remarkable, because the highest life is the result of the most free interchange of relations, and intelligence is supposed to penetrate and interpenetrate Boston as completely as its horse-railway tracks. For Boston, in the popular estimation, is the place not only where you can and must know everything, but where you can go anywhere for six cents. Mental and physical circulation are practically free.

It was in this same alert city that another successful experiment on human credulity was made a few years ago. I refer to Mrs. Howe's remarkable Woman's Bank. It was not remarkable, perhaps, that a woman should appear, possessed of the financial genius to create and carry on such a scheme; but it was remarkable that women of standing, known to be honest and believed to be sane, should indorse it and warmly defend it. It proposed, it will be remembered, to pay depositors ninety-six per cent. a year, so that a poor woman who intrusted a hundred dollars to it would receive eight dollars a month income, and at the end of the year find her capital unimpaired. And depositors actually did receive eight per cent. a month for some time. This was accepted as a demonstration that they would receive eight per cent. a month forever. And it will be remembered that the women who defended this magnificent system of

banking insisted, in print, that the scheme broke down, not because its principle was unsound, but because it was attacked by enemies who were hostile to this benevolent plan of helping poor teachers and seamstresses. But for this brutal opposition it would have succeeded. Of course, such a scheme could not be carried on without confidence. It was another case of mind-cure.

But it must already appear that I am using Boston only as a type. This is, everybody admits, a scientific age, a skeptical age, an age in which men are not willing to accept anything that does not stand the test of investigation, analysis; to believe anything upon which they have not the evidence of the physical senses. And this is the reason why this age is more subject to illusions and delusions than any other of which I have read. The delusions are not exactly of the same sort as in the myth and legend-making period of the Middle Ages; we have got rid of many superstitions, of the dread of many portents in nature; there may be few who have Dr. Johnson's belief in apparitions, or Sir Matthew Hale's credulity in regard to witches; but there are certain delusions that are much more widely spread than formerly, and take a deeper hold, because we have a conceit that they rest upon a semi-scientific basis, and upon evidence that we regard as irrefragable, the evidence of our senses. And these delusions are not, as most of them once were, confined to the confessedly ignorant, or due to a want of some investigation of natural law; but they prevail among intelligent, even intellectual, minds, which have a habit of skepticism, and demand physical proof before believing. That which is called spiritualism has a purely physical basis. It is a matter of the senses. Men and women believe simply because they are brought in contact with physical manifestations. They hear certain sounds, they see certain objects and certain tangible results of what they are told are spiritual processes, and they believe that a spirit is materialized because they see it. They *see* a human body floating in the air about the room, in defiance of gravitation. They believe that it does so float, because they see it, and because they do not bring any faculties of the mind to rectify what is known to be one of the most fallible witnesses in the world—the human eye-sight.

These people are the fools of their senses, and it may be said in a general way that this scientific generation is more or less

the fool of its senses. We incline to apply to everything the material test. We are taught to believe in the existence of nothing that we cannot see or feel, or reduce to palpable terms by some sort of analysis. We have a sort of philosophy that calls that knowable which can be subjected to physical tests, and regards as unknowable that which eludes the dissecting-knife and the test-tube. There are men and women who are trying to conduct life on this material basis.

Let us see what it is. In our experience, no two eyes see an object exactly in the same way. This discrepancy is owing to a mechanical difference in eyes, which we understand, and to a difference in the report that this organ makes to the brains, which we do not so well understand. It is the same with the sense of hearing and of touch. Upon these variations (eliminating the questions of motives and dishonesty) arise the variations in human testimony, with which we are familiar, both in common life and in judicial procedure. We know how rare it is that a story will pass from one person to another unchanged, how rare it is that two persons will report a conversation, or an occurrence, or describe an object seen by both at the same time, with accurate agreement. One of the commonest cases is that of identity. How often it happens in private life, as well as in the law courts, that two sets of witnesses, of equal credibility apparently, contradict each other squarely as to personal identity.

It happens in this age of facts and of investigation into natural laws, which boasts that it has escaped from mental delusions and superstitions, that persons who stand most squarely upon visible phenomena are often most subject to delusions. It is natural that this should be so, for when a man plants himself upon the ground of believing only what he can see, he is apt to believe all that he can see,—he will trust his senses. He accounts himself a practical, hard-headed, clear-sighted person. He boasts of his common sense. You cannot deceive him. But he can deceive himself. He knows that a human body floated in the air, because he saw it. He knows that his friend was cured by a mind-cure man, because his friend, who could not walk a step, was able to run after sitting half an hour in the room with a mind-cure man. His credulity on the side of his senses passes belief. And the real trouble is not with the man's eye-sight or hearing, but with his logical faculty, his want of self-knowledge; his mind is trained only on one side; he has

no system of philosophy to correct the inherent defects of his physical organization. A materialistic education, at the best, is only a half education.

Now, we may not care for the mind-cure man, nor for the clairvoyant, nor for the so-called spiritualistic phenomena, nor the Woman's Bank. We are using them merely as illustrations of the mental condition of a considerable number of people in this country, or, if you please, of the sort of education, or the tendency of the sort of education that prevails a good deal, and is advocated by a good many people who are not themselves subject to any of the delusions we have been speaking of, an education that, oddly enough, has got the name of practical, because it is supposed to sharpen the senses, train the observing faculties (no matter about the reasoning faculties), and to fit men and women for the real work in life, that is, for getting money and keeping it.

It is not necessary to waste a moment, except to get the right point of view of our subject, upon a condition of the social state with which everybody is familiar. When the chief end of nine persons out of ten is to get rich, and get rich speedily by any means, to the neglect of the mind and even of the body, holding as the cheapest of all possessions books and a contact with the great and entertaining minds of the world, it is no wonder that society-talk, social intercourse, especially among young men, is vapid, pervaded by the mercantile and materialistic spirit, void for the most part of intellectual life, lacking seriousness or ambition, interested only in the frivolities of society and the gaming chances of the street, cultivating moral and mental flabbiness and intellectual vacuity, so that the satirist, with the best intentions, is baffled in an effort to get hold of substance enough in such a life to exercise his sarcasm on. Useless, as a novelist of Queen Anne's time might have said, to paint a society that is painted already.

It might be out of place to mention this here, if it were not a symptom of a well-nigh universal tendency and temper of the public mind. For if getting money, or material success, is really the chief concern, and ought to be, then the underlying philosophy of the time is quite right, and our prevalent theories of education ought to be applied to the end. If it is true that there is no want in the human soul greater than the want of knowledge for material ends, then literature, and what has

been for some centuries understood as a liberal education, are quite useless pursuits. If, I say, the object of an education is mainly to fit a man or woman to take effective part in the struggle for money and place, the direction in which we are urged to go by many high authorities is the right one.

It is not, however, the direction that the philosophers and sages have pointed out. It is not the notion that Plato had of the value to the state and to the individual character of the pursuit of wealth rather than of the things of the mind. You remember that the Athenian Stranger in the "Laws" said that men were ready to pursue any branch of knowledge for the sake of gain; and in this he was a prophet of the state of men's minds in our own time.

The movement is substantially all one way. Those who protest against it stand in a stream, and are jeered at as conservatives and obstructionists. The movement is toward making money and making it quickly, toward every sort of material development and advancement, toward luxury and the indulgence of the senses, toward the sort of education only that can be made immediately serviceable to material ends.

The movement is all of a piece. It is all characterized by a want of the highest aims. The frivolous and vapid society of a certain class is in affinity with the practical purposes of the others. The main object in life being material development, the cultivation of whatever will contribute to material enterprise, a contempt for any pursuit that is not profitable, or any study that cannot add to the money value of the world; the whole motive being low and unspiritual, the flower must necessarily be vulgar display and a social life empty and frivolous. This is the natural flower and fruit of a materialistic age. The fruit of a materialistic education—in which the higher aspirations of the soul are not provided for—is not only a lowering of the aims of life and a deadening of the spirit, but a liability to such delusions as we have spoken of. It would seem, *a priori*, that the cultivation of the scientific spirit, with the sharpening of the physical senses, and a high training of the powers of observation, ought to relieve us from delusions. In individual cases, it doubtless does. If it were true as a general rule, a freedom from delusions ought to be the mark of this generation. But, in fact, and it is becoming evident daily, a purely scientific education is only a half education; it leaves out of view cer-



tain faculties that are as necessary to the enjoyment as to the conduct of life, and it leaves the mind defenseless on one side and unable to correct errors. A mere metaphysical training tends to speculation, and refinement of casuistry, and a ballooning of the imagination. It was the mission of the eighteenth century with the inductive philosophy to bring men back to realities. We are in no danger of underrating its splendid results in modern life. We seem to be in danger of forgetting the importance, to the individual mind and to society, of literature and philosophy, and the laying up of intellectual goods that are safe from moths and from thieves. I beg readers to notice that it is not a question between real science and real literature,—between which there can be no quarrel,—but it is a question of the prostitution of all learning and all methods and facilities of education to merely material purposes, leaving out of view the fact that if you pursue learning not primarily for the cultivation of the mind itself, and in the pursuit of truth, but for concrete ends of utility, you inevitably lower the tone and *morale* of life.

The drift of the age is so strongly materialistic and luxury-loving, and so plainly to the curious kinship we see between skepticism and delusion, that one would think scholars would make a united stand against it in the only way they can resist it—that is, by insisting upon the culture of the mind itself, upon a training of the logical and reasoning faculties, upon precisely those studies that are needed to broaden the mind and enlarge the conception of the life that has been lived, and ought to be lived, in this world, and are as far as possible removed from the so-called practical pursuits that absorb the most of us. One would think that in the colleges and universities the standard of the higher learning might be maintained, that instead of accommodating themselves to the commercial spirit, they would preserve a few places free from it, places where the elevating influences of life should be cultivated.

But the materializing spirit, the industrial spirit, which demands the bending of all powers and all learning to its purposes, is too strong for many of them. This spirit insists that the knowledge of how to shoe and cure a horse, set type, build a railway, assay metals, suit fertilizers to soils, conduct a business, is an education; and if you throw in a modern language or two, it is, I suppose, a liberal education. That is to say, education—this is the reasoning—must be suited to the

exigencies of modern life, instead of endeavoring somewhat to ennoble and correct the tendency of modern life by education.

It is this industrial and commercial spirit, this denial of the higher wants of the soul, under whatever pretense it is disguised, that is demanding a radical revision of the college curriculum, and that the ancient stamp of scholarship shall be put upon fitness for industrial and commercial pursuits. The pretense is often plausible. Young men must be fitted for their work in life; it is the business of a university to teach anything that anybody wants to learn; the number of necessary knowledges has greatly multiplied; it is not possible to give a young man, in four years, the necessary knowledge that he can apply on his graduation and at the same time a training in the humanities; something must be thrown overboard, and, of course, that must go which will be of the least service to a young man in earning a living; though it will be noticed that this argument was never raised in the case of young men destined to the ministry, the law, or medicine. There is competent testimony that a classical training is as necessary to the higher pursuits of science as it is in the professions. But the inference is that the highest object of an education is what these practical people say it is. I presume there are Christian churches that would admit members on a show of works, though the candidates had not faith enough to be detected by a microscope.

It seems to me that just at this moment there is need of insisting upon the importance in life of a pure intellectual culture for as many persons as can obtain it, and of supplementing the practical training with the intellectual culture whenever possible. I know that it is argued that the new learning (and we are constantly reminded that it was not many centuries ago that the classics were opposed as the new learning) is as fit for the highest discipline and training of the intellect as the now traditional humanities.

The analogy sought to be made between the former opposition to the introduction of the classics and the substitution of something else for the classics in a university curriculum, is thought to be very significant. In the language of one of the chief advocates for, at least, a partial substitution, for placing the new studies on a par with the old as to the degree that shall mean to the world a liberal education:

“It took two hundred years for the Greek language and literature gradually to displace in great part the scholastic metaphysics, which, with scholastic theology, have been for generations regarded as the main staple of liberal education. . . . The revived classical literature was vigorously and sincerely opposed as frivolous, heterodox, and useless for discipline; just as natural history, chemistry, physics, and modern literature are now opposed. The conservatives of that day used precisely the same arguments which the conservatives of to-day bring forward, only they were used against classical literature then, while now they are used in its support.”

I suppose that President Eliot means by this illustration that there is a progress of ideas, and that there must be a progressive adaptation of methods and means, and he says that he has no intention of abandoning the classics, but only of putting other studies on an equality with them. But if his analogy is put forward as anything more than an interesting historical reminiscence, as a logical argument, then, in the popular apprehension of his position — though he should not be held responsible for that — we should have a syllogism something like this:

Men four hundred years ago opposed the substitution of the classics for scholastic metaphysics as useless for discipline, just as now men oppose the substitution of the sciences, etc., for the classics as comparatively useless for discipline. But the men four hundred years ago were in error in opposing the substitution of the classics. Therefore, the men now are in error in opposing the substitution of the sciences.

And some might be inclined to travesty this syllogism by another:

Many artists in the sixteenth century opposed the substitution of the canons of Greek art for those then current, just as many artists now oppose the substitution of American canons of art for the Greek. But the artists of the sixteenth century were in error in opposing the substitution of the Greek. Therefore, the artists to-day are in error in opposing the substitution of the American.

Notwithstanding these excellent syllogisms, the question remains whether the renaissance of literature, art, and social philosophy in the sixteenth century was or was not a solid, indispensable, and permanent addition to modern culture and discipline.

It is not the purpose of this paper to go specially into the question of the classics. It is my main desire to call attention

to the origin and the spirit of this demand upon the universities, identified as it is with the commercial spirit and the lax notions of education that partially account for many delusions. But it comes in our way to notice one or two things.

I suppose it will be admitted that the NOTE of a liberal education is that it is not provincial or local, but universal. It is the range of thought and not of body that determines whether a man is provincial. Thoreau, on Walden Pond, reading the Greek poets and keeping an eye on the musk-rat and the squirrel and other like visitors, was free of a much larger world than many who have been round the globe. The object of culture is to put a man in relation with the ideas of all ages and civilizations, not to confine him to the ideas local, or of the age in which he lives. And the mind gets the most enlargement from that which is unfamiliar to it, remote from its own inheritance, tradition, local association. This is the use of travel to an observing man, who is capable of assimilating to his mental growth the reports of his senses. This is the use of the study of any of the natural sciences—the enlargement of the mind resulting from an extended field of observation, rather than the value of the collected facts. For the mind may be full of facts in half a dozen sciences, and yet be as dry and infertile as a chip. This is the value of a study of the modern languages, that it opens to one not simply new ways of expressing ideas, which may be of little value, but new methods of thinking and new ways of looking at life and all its problems. Peoples differ in mental constitution, in moral attributes, in intellectual characteristics, just as much as their languages differ in form; for language is not an accidental or artificial product, but an expression of something deep in the life of the people out of whose habits and character and necessities it grew. And that, I suppose, is why translation is so difficult from one tongue to another. It is not a slight thing that is lost, it is the essence of life. And this difficulty of translating increases in exact proportion as the characters and mental and moral traits of the peoples differ. It is as difficult to translate Persian into English as it is for us to get ourselves into the attitude of the oriental mind. But when, through a knowledge of an oriental language, we have come in some degree to take in the oriental attitude of mind, we have a solid and extensive addition to culture and a distinct enlargement of our own mind.

Now, the great objection to the study of Greek—and I am speaking of it now with reference solely to a liberal education, and to a want in the human soul greater than the want of mere knowledge, and not as to its fitness to enable a person to earn good wages in an industrial establishment—is that Greek is a dead language, and Greek life and habits are remote from modern sympathies. That is the very reason I would urge for its study, being what it is, and expressing a civilization and a habit of thought that have passed away. Admitting that it is a dead language, and not for the moment insisting upon its importance in our own language and that it is an expression only of a foreign and remote civilization, I seem to have stated the strongest argument for its being retained in any education deserving to be called liberal. The Greek way of looking at life was different from ours, the whole mental habit was different; this is as evident in its attitude toward the deepest questions as in the play of the lighter and sportive faculties, in wit and humor. With only a superficial acquaintance with its literature I can see that. These people were of our human nature and of like passions, yet in their presence I am conscious of an unlikeness, of a new mystery of existence. The language, the literature, and the people are one. The whole woof and warp of the life of the people, the habit of mind, the philosophy of their living, are interwoven in, and expressed by, their language. This language is as distinct and important a creation in the world as Greek art. It is the mirror, if one may say so, of a wonderful people. To come to a knowledge of this people and their way of looking at life, in the only way it can perfectly be reached,—by their language,—is a great intellectual effort. The very attempt to comprehend a whole system and civilization so different from our own involves not only a vigorous mental discipline, but an enlargement of the faculties very different from the sort of “drill” that is sometimes called discipline. For I am not now speaking of gerund-grinding, but of such a knowledge of Greek life and literature as is now understood by the study of Greek. It not only, as President Eliot says, required two centuries to introduce the study of Greek, but it has taken three more to learn how to study it properly. Perhaps it will turn out that the coming age, more even than the time of the Renaissance, will reap fruits of inestimable value from

the people who still remain the highest examples of simple culture.

There can be no more remunerative effort for the mind than that of putting itself in the position to understand the Greek thought about nature, and about man, and the meaning of life. And this because, as I said before, it is alien to us and to all our modern habits. We get from this study the sort of discipline and intellectual breadth which we cannot possibly get from the study of any modern language, because the ideas, the way of regarding life in these languages, are modern and very much like our own. The Greek chapter in human life is remote, it is closed, it is complete, it is unchangeable, it is set apart as a unique and most instructive performance. The mind is greatly enlarged and fructified by the investigation of any ancient life—Egyptian, Assyrian, Indian; but that of no other nation offers us the same facilities, the same opportunities, as the Greek, in a life so completely expressed in art and in letters. The intellectual effort required to put ourselves *en rapport* with this totally foreign mind seems to me to be of the highest kind and of the highest service. I can conceive of nothing equal to it in the way of bringing the faculties into vigorous play and liberalizing the mind.

There is another and very practical aspect of the question; I mean the value of a classical training as a foundation for high attainments in science, that is, a scientific education not limited by, or dependent on, practical aims. A commercial knowledge of French and German does not require the help of college or university; and a polytechnic school will furnish such a knowledge of science for practical use as the industries demand. The utilitarian spirit not only demands the substitution of something else for the classics, but it demands a university stamp for a polytechnic education. Now, we are speaking of a real education, and the point insisted on is that a preliminary training in the humanities, in the classics, and especially in Greek, is necessary to high attainments in the sciences and in all the modern languages, including our own. In support of this, I refer to the opinions, based upon experience, of the foremost scholars in science now living; and I do this not in the mere interest of Greek or of science, but of the highest aims of education. It is profoundly significant that the most powerful plea ever made in behalf of the classics should come from the side of science.

The Opinions of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin, and the address of the great chemist, Dr. Hofmann, the rector, upon the necessity of Greek and Latin as means of the best mental training, have been so often published in this country that it is only necessary for me to refer to them here. The testimony, based on experience, of the necessity of a classical training in the higher walks of science is unequivocal and unanimous. It is of the utmost importance because it goes to the root of the subject of mental training. The pupils without the classical training "had no clear consciousness of their own scientific capacity, and no sure insight into the growth of man's mental life"; "they suffer from the whims of independence and the lack of self-knowledge." Prof. Hofmann says: "Ideality in academic study, unselfish devotion to science for its own sake, and that unshackled activity of thought which is at once the condition and the consequence of such devotion, retire more and more into the background as the classical groundwork of our mental life found in the gymnasium is withdrawn from the pre-university course." "The ideality of the scientific sense, interest in learning not dependent upon, nor limited by, practical aims, but ministering to the liberal education of the mind as such, the many-sided and widely extended exercise of the thinking power," can be satisfactorily cultivated only in classical institutions. It is the experience in America as well as in Germany that the best civil engineers are those who have had a thorough classical training. The effect of opening the university to non-classical students on equal terms with the classical is the lowering of university instruction itself. Another significant fact is that the directors of the realschule, in order to prevent a constant falling off in standards, require that teachers in them shall have had a classical training.

A criticism has been made upon the report of the Berlin faculty that it was unfair as to the test of performance of the pupils of the realschulen in the university, because these students come from a lower class in society, and have not behind them the traditions of culture of the pupils from the gymnasium. The obvious and sufficient answer to that is, that if the realschule standards prevail, a general deterioration is inevitable, and in another generation all the students will be down to the realschule standard.

The last demand of the industrial spirit is that all education shall be lowered to its material aims; for lowered it will be if all distinction is removed in academic honor between an education for the sake of the mind itself and an education dependent on and limited to material and practical aims. The danger in this is no less to science than to literature and philosophy. It is greatest of all to the tone of modern life. The drift of society is pretty much all one way. The industrial spirit can take care of itself and get all it wants. If those who care for the things of the spirit, for the highest mental life, expect to save anything in the deluge, they must make a united and stout defense of the ledge of rock on which they stand that is still above water.

CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.